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Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste both have new coalition 
governments following mid-year parliamentary elections, but 
the processes that produced them and the outcomes could 
not be more dissimilar. While PNG’s election was in the news 
for weeks for all the wrong reasons, the government that swift-
ly took office following the election is currently looking solid. 
Timor-Leste, in contrast, conducted a copybook election but 
government formation was slow and fraught and the minority 
government that was ultimately appointed is looking very shaky. 
Voting in PNG was scheduled to run on a rolling basis from 
24 June to 8 July. From the outset, the process went into melt-
down. Tens of thousands of eligible voters were missing from 
the official electoral roll, voting materials were delayed, ballot 
papers fell well short of voter numbers, polling locations and 
dates were changed with little if any notice, and polling had to 
be extended in some districts. At some polling stations, voters 
whose names were not on the roll were turned away in large 
numbers; elsewhere, all those who presented were issued with 
ballot papers including the improbably young. Unsurprisingly, 
rumours of manipulation and malfeasance abounded. Part way 
through the polling period, the Electoral Advisory Committee 
resigned declaring that the PNG Electoral Commission had 
starved it of the information needed to monitor the election 
effectively and the Observer Group from the Commonwealth 
took the unusual step of calling for an immediate and thorough 
review of all aspects of the electoral process. 
Vote counting was protracted and controversial. Although 
the original 24 July date for return of writs was extended to 28 
July, over 20 per cent of seats were still undeclared at that point 
and counting in the final seat dragged into late September as 
officials struggled to find a safe location for it (Dorney 18/8/2017). 
In several parts of the highlands the count triggered rioting and 
violence, and by October the number of election-related killings 
had climbed to over 30, with some estimates suggesting a higher 
figure still (Blades 3/10/2017). The death toll included four police.
The voters of Timor-Leste went to the polls on a single 
day – 22 July – and voting was orderly and peaceful. Voting 
materials arrived before polling was due to start, the polls 
opened on time and voters turned out in force armed with their 
voting cards and were quickly identified and marked off the roll. 
At close of voting, votes were counted in the polling centres 
under the scrutiny of party officials and observers, the tally was 
formally recorded in each centre and the unofficial national 
results were circulating the next day. The provisional results 
were formally released by the National Electoral Commission 
a few days later. The EU observer group commended the 
election as ’well-administered, credible and inclusive’, and 
conducted in a ‘peaceful environment’ (EU EOM 25/7/2017). 
Post-election government formation in the two countries 
involves very different constitutional mechanisms. PNG has a 
Westminster-style constitution and the prime minister is elect-
ed by the parliament and formally appointed by the Head of 
State.1 The process begins with the return of writs following the 
election, when the Head of State invites the political party with 
a plurality of votes to form government.2 At the first meeting of 
the new parliament, the party approached by the Head of State 
puts forward its prime ministerial nominee. Under Timor-Leste’s 
semi-presidential constitution, the prime minister is nominated 
by the political party with the largest vote share or by the alli-
ance of political parties with the majority of seats. The Presi-
dent proceeds to appoint that nominee after consulting with 
the political parties represented in the parliament. This process 
engages the party machines: the members of parliament them-
selves do not vote on the leader.3
On the date fixed for the return of writs in PNG, only 88 of 
111 seats had been declared, of which the Electoral Commis-
sioner conveyed only 80 to the Governor-General, the lowest 
proportion in the country’s history (Tlozek 29/7/2017). There 
were suggestions that the delays in declarations advantaged 
the party of the incumbent prime minister, Peter O’Neill, which 
was duly invited to form government (May 9/8/2017). The 
ombudsman intervened to seek an extension of the deadline 
for writs to maximise the number of elected MPs able to vote 
for the prime minister (Tlozek 29/7/2017). When the parlia-
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mentary vote was taken on 2 August, O’Neill was elected with 
60 votes to 46. Six weeks later, another 12 MPs moved from 
the opposition benches to join the government, buttressing 
O’Neill’s hold on power (ibid.). Several more have since joined 
the governing coalition.4
In Timor-Leste five parties won seats in the election, but 
none achieved a majority in its own right. Two parties – FRETI-
LIN and CNRT – achieved the largest vote share in the 65-mem-
ber parliament with 23 and 22 seats respectively. These two 
parties, alone or in coalition with others but never formally with 
each other, had led all governments since independence. Three 
minor parties – PDP, PD and KHUNTO – won eight, seven and 
five seats respectively. Prior to the election CNRT and FRETILIN 
had cooperated closely in government, although not formally in 
coalition, in what was characterised as ‘consensus democra-
cy’, and FRETILIN foreshadowed an inclusive form of govern-
ment continuing after the election. With the results in, FRETILIN 
as the party with the most votes sought to open negotiations 
with the other four parties on a governing coalition. 
It was met with a stampede to the opposition bench-
es. CNRT’s iconic leader, Xanana Gusmao, who days before 
the election anticipated winning an outright majority of seats, 
went to ground for two weeks before re-emerging at his par-
ty’s congress to recommend that the party go into opposition. 
PDP, a newly formed party, had signalled its intent to serve in 
opposition before the election. Its rationale was to hold gov-
ernment to account, something it argued was missing from the 
consensus democracy of the previous five years. PD, never an 
ally of FRETILIN, was an unlikely coalition partner leaving only 
KHUNTO receptive to FRETILIN’s initial overtures to join the 
government benches.
As FRETILIN-led negotiations dragged on, the prescribed 
timelines for convening the new parliament and appoint-
ing the government fell by the wayside (Fundasaun Mahein 
25/8/2017). A mooted alliance of FRETILIN, PDP and KUNTO 
failed to materialise. A shaky alliance of FRETILIN, PD and 
KHUNTO did form and held together long enough for parlia-
ment to convene on 5 September and elect a FRETILIN MP 
as its president. Presaging trouble to come, not all MPs in 
the tripartite alliance voted for the FRETILIN candidate and 
eight days later KHUNTO pulled out of the alliance. Pressing 
ahead regardless, Timor-Leste’s President anointed a minority 
government headed by FRETILIN’s Mari Alkatiri, swearing in a 
core group of 12 ministers on 15 September; further members 
of the government were sworn in on 3 October and 13 Octo-
ber. Amongst them were some from CNRT and PDP, although 
without the formal sanction of their parties.
The minority government is already in serious trouble. On 
19 October the three opposition parties, which just days before 
had formalised a coalition, rejected the government’s proposed 
five-year program.5 If the program is rejected for a second time, 
the constitution requires that the government be dismissed. The 
constitution is less explicit on what happens next. The govern-
ment has argued that a fresh election be held; the opposition 
majority alliance has argued that the President invite it to form 
government. Whatever the outcome, it will be controversial.
This brief comparison of PNG and Timor-Leste suggests 
that a well-conducted election does not guarantee political 
stability while a contested election can settle into stable 
government. The character of political institutions, political 
culture and the stance of key actors also significantly shape the 
prospects for stability or instability.
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Endnotes
1. Constitution of the Independent State of Papua New 
Guinea, s.142.
2. Constitution s.130A(e) and Organic Law on the Integrity of 
Political Parties and Candidates 2003, s.63.
3. Constitution of the Democratic Republic of Timor-Leste, 
art.106.
4. Ron May, personal communication.
5. The Opposition subsequently stonewalled discussion of the 
government’s additional budget proposal in parliament.
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